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THE CORPORATE OPPORTUNITY DOCTRINE
James C. Slaughter
I. INTRODUCTION
More and more frequently the modern businessman is a member
of two or more business organizations engaged in the same type of
business. For example, he may be an officer of an investment corpora-
tion as well as a member of a partnership interested in the same type
of investments. If a profitable business opportunity arises, he faces
the problem of whether to acquire it for the corporation, for the
partnership, or for himself personally.
Fiduciary principles forbid directors and officers of a corporation,
as insiders, from utilizing their strategic positions for private benefit
to the detriment of the corporation.! If a business opportunity arises
that should be acquired for the corporation, it is called a "corporate
opportunity."' If diverted by an insider, the opportunity is subject
to a constructive trust for the benefit of the corporation.' A state-
ment of the rule is simple; the difficulty arises in determining whether
a business opportunity is also a corporate opportunity.
Guth v. Loft4 is a leading case in the area of corporate opportuni-
ties. In this case, the court noted:
It is true that when a business opportunity comes to a corporate officer
or director in his individual capacity rather than in his official capacity,
and the opportunity is one which, because of the nature of the enter-
prise, is not essential to his corporation, and is one in which it has no
interest or expectancy, the officer or director is entitled to treat the op-
portunity as his own, and the corporation has no interest in it, if, of
course, the officer or director has not wrongfully embarked the cor-
poration's resources therein ...
On the other hand, it is equally true that, if there is presented to a
corporate officer or director a business opportunity which the corpora-
tion is financially able to undertake, is, from its nature, in the line of
the corporation's business and is of practical advantage to it, is one in
which the corporation has an interest or a reasonable expectancy, and,
'Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295 (1939); Guth v. Loth, 23 Del. Ch. 255, 5 A.2d 503
(Sup. Ct. 1939); Durfee v. Durfee & Canning, Inc., 323 Mass. 187, 80 N.E.2d 522 (1948).
" Guth v. Loft, suPra note 1; Durfee v. Durfee & Canning, Inc., supra note 1; Diedrick
v. Helm, 217 Minn. 483, 14 N.W.2d 913 (1944); Pioneer Oil & Gas Co. v. Anderson, 168
Miss. 334, 151 So. 161 (1933); Blaustein v. Pan American Petroleum & Transp. Co., 293
N.Y. 281, 56 N.E.2d 705 (1944).
'New v. New, 148 Cal. App. 2d 372, 306 P.2d 987 (Dist. Ct. App. 1957); Guth v.
Loft, 23 Del. Ch. 255, 5 A.2d 503 (Sup. Ct. 1939); Durfee v. Durfee & Canning, Inc., 323
Mass. 187, 80 N.E.2d 522 (1948).
423 Del. Ch. 255, S A.2d 503 (Sup. Ct. 1939), noted in 13 Temp. L.Q. 534 (1939).
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by embracing the opportunity the self-interest of the officer or director
will be brought into conflict with that of his corporation, the law will
not permit him to seize the opportunity for himself.'
The court then stated that the existence of a corporate opportunity
depends on whether there is a specific duty on the part of an officer
to act in regard to the particular matter as the representative of the
corporation, a fact determination. Despite the language of the Guth
case, at least three tests for determining the existence of a corporate
opportunity have been propounded at various times."
The "expectancy test" stands for the proposition that the existence
of a corporate opportunity is limited to (1) property in which the
corporation has either an existing interest or an expectancy growing
out of an existing right or (2) situations in which interference by a
director or officer will in some degree frustrate the corporation in
effecting the purpose of its creation.! Although many courts have
purported to use this test," it is difficult to ascertain its exact breadth
of application. The "expectancy" spoken of in the first part is a
right which by its nature is inchoate' and, therefore, involves prop-
erty in which the corporation has an imperfect right. In the second
part such terms as "director interference" and "frustration of cor-
porate purpose" have proved to be ambiguous.
'id. at 510-11.
6 A fourth approach has been suggested in Carrington & McElrov, The Doctrine of Cor-
porate Opportunity as Applied to Officers, Directors and Stockholders of Corporations,
14 Bus. Law. 957 (1959). In many cases, the use of the corporate opportunity doctrine is
unnecessary since the same results could be obtained by reference to elementary and long
established rules of agency and trust to which officers and directors of corporations are sub-
jected by virtue of their duty of loyalty.
"tAustrian v. Williams, 103 F. Supp. 64 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd on other grounds, 198 F.2d
697 (2d Cir. 1952); Colorado & Utah Coal Co. v. Harris, 97 Colo. 309, 49 P.2d 429
(1935); Lincoln Stores, Inc. v. Grant, 309 Mass. 417, 34 N.E.2d 704 (1941); Diedrick
v. Helm, 217 Minn. 483, 14 N.W.2d 913 (1944); Pioneer Oil & Gas Co. v. Anderson,
168 Miss. 334, 151 So. 161 (1933); Washer v. Seager, 272 App. Div. 297, 71 N.Y.S.2d
46 (Sup. Ct. 1947); Blaustein v. Pan American Petroleum & Transp. Co., 293 N.Y. 281,
56 N.E.2d 705 (1944).
Ibid.
'See Colorado & Utah Coal Co. v. Harris, 97 Colo. 309, 49 P.2d 429 (1935); Lincoln
Stores, Inc. v. Grant, 309 Mass. 417, 34 N.E.2d 704 (1941); Solimine v. Hollander, 128
N.J. Eq. 228, 16 A.2d 203 (Ch. 1940); Blaustein v. Pan American Petroleum & Tranap. Co.,
293 N.Y. 281, 56 N.E.2d 705 (1944); cf. McCourt v. Singers-Bigger, 145 Fed. 103 (8th
Cir. 1906); Pike's Peak Co. v. Pfunter, 158 Mich. 412, 413 N.W. 19 (1909); see also Fuller,
Restrictions Imposed by the Directorship Status on the Personal Business Activities of Direc-
tors, 26 Wash. U.L.Q. 189, 192 (1941).
In Westerly Theatre Operating Co. v. Pouzzner, 162 F.2d 821 (1st Cir. 1947), a cor-
poration was held to have been deprived of a corporate opportunity. A director, the original
lessee of property which he had sublet to the corporation, had renewed his lease but had re-
fused to renew the sublease to the corporation.
:"Carper v. Frost Oil Co., 72 Colo. 345, 211 Pac. 370 (1922); Lincoln Stores, Inc. v.
Grant, 309 Mass. 417, 34 N.E.2d 704 (1941); Pioneer Oil & Gas Co. v. Anderson, 168
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A second method for determining the existence of a corporate op-
portunity is the "line of business test."" This test provides that a
corporation is deprived of an opportunity whenever an insider en-
gages in a business closely associated with the existing or prospective
activities of his corporation, even though the activity is not unfair
to his corporation.
Under the third method, the "fairness test," determination of the
existence of a corporate opportunity requires an application of ethical
standards of fairness to facts."2 There is no general rule to cover
all situations; the test is applied to the facts and circumstances exist-
ing at the time the officer or director appropriated the opportunity."
Considerable objection has been made to the "expectancy test" on
grounds that it is unduly narrow and vague."4 Most cases ostensibly
enunciating the first part of the "expectancy test"; i.e., that the op-
portunity must be property in which the corporation has an interest
or tangible expectancy; actually followed the "fairness test" because
they weighed the various facts and decided what was fair under the
circumstances." The second part of the "expectancy test," which
limits (in the absence of a property interest or expectancy) a corpor-
ate opportunity to situations in which the opportunity is necessary for
the continued existence or prosperity of the corporation, is definitely
too restrictive in the light of many cases which hold that a possibility
Miss. 334, 151 So. 161 (1933); Nebraska Power Co. v. Koenig, 93 Neb. 39, 139 N.W. 839
(1913); Gauger v. Hintz, 262 Wis. 333, 55 N.W.2d 426 (1953); Note, Liability of Direc-
tors for Taking Corporate Opportunities, Using Corporate Facilities, or Engaging in a Com-
peting Business, 39 Colum. L. Rev. 219, 223 (1939).
" Some basis for the "line of business test" is found in Turner v. American Metal Co.,
268 App. Div. 239, 50 N.Y.S.2d 800 (Sup. Ct. 1944). The court states that in cases in
which the corporate opportunity doctrine had been applied, the object of the opportunity
has had the inherent aptitude of being integrated into the then existing business of the
corporation. See also Comment, 74 Harv. L. Rev. 765 (1961).
12 Ballantine, Corporations § 79 (rev. ed. 1946); Fuller, supra note 9; Scott, The Fidu-
ciary Principle, 37 Calif. L. Rev. 539, 551 (1949); Comment, Liability of Directors and
Other Officers for Usurpation of Corporate Opportunities, 26 Fordham L. Rev. 528 (1957);
Note, 31 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 403 (1956).
"aKahn v. Schiff, 105 F. Supp. 973 (S.D. Ohio 1952); Guth v. Loft, 23 Del. Ch. 255,
5 A.2d 503 (Sup. Ct. 1939); Blaustein v. Pan American Petroleum & Transp. Co., 293 N.Y.
281, 56 N.E.2d 705 (1944); Turner v. American Metal Co., 268 App. Div. 239, 50 N.Y.S.2d
800 (Sup. Ct. 1944); Litwin v. Allen, 25 N.Y.S.2d 667 (Sup. Ct. 1940); Gottlieb v. Mead
Corp., 137 N.E.2d 178 (Ohio C.P. 1954).
"'E.g., see Fuller, supra note 9; Scott, supra note 12; Comment, 26 Fordham L. Rev. 528,
529 (1957).
"See Largarde v. Anniston Lime & Stone Co., 126 Ala. 496, 28 So. 199 (1900); Lincoln
Stores, Inc. v. Grant, 309 Mass. 417, 34 N.E.2d 704 (1941); Pioneer Oil & Gas Co. v.
Anderson, 168 Miss. 334, 151 So. 161 (1933). The courts in the above cases merely ex-
amined the various factors present, decided that fairness required a certain conclusion, and
explained their decisions by using expectancy and property interest labels. Accord, Kaufman
v. Wolfson, 153 F. Supp. 253 (S.D.N.Y. 1957); Johnston v. Greene, 121 A.2d 919 (Del.
Sup. Ct. 1956); Blaustein v. Pan American Petroleum & Transp. Co., 293 N.Y. 281, 56
N.E.2d 705 (1944); Gauger v. Hintz, 262 Wis. 333, 55 N.W.2d 426 (1953).
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of harm to the corporation need not be present for the corporate op-
portunity doctrine to apply.'"
Two cases have specifically disapproved the "expectancy test." In
Rosenblum v. Judson Engineering Corp.,' the court stated that al-
though a corporation had no present interest or expectancy in the
acquisition of the new business and it was not essential to the cor-
poration's present needs, the directors might still be liable. In Durfee
v. Durfee &¢ Canning, Inc.," the court stated that the test was not
whether the corporation has an existing interest or an expectancy in
the property involved, but whether, in the particular circumstances,
the acquisition of the opportunity by an insider would be unfair. Such
unfairness was to be determined by an application of ethical standards
to the facts. This case, however, may be authority in only a limited
situation because the court, with respect to the test employed, drew
a distinction between Durfee, in which the insider attempted to resell
the opportunity to his corporation at a profit, and Lincoln Stores, Inc.
v. Grant,19 in which no such attempt was made.
Although Durfee may be viewed as limiting the application of the
"fairness test" to resale situations, many other cases have not been
so restrictive.'" Moreover, in American Investment Co. v. Lichten-
stein," the court stated that the true basis for the decision in Durfee
was not an expectancy or property interest, but the unfairness of the
fiduciary taking advantage of an opportunity if the interests of his
corporation justly call for protection. The court went even further
and construed the decision in Guth v. Loft" as supporting the "fair-
ness test." Therefore, it appears that the "fairness test.' has been
used in the more recent cases to determine the applicability of the
corporate opportunity doctrine."
"0These cases, in effect, state that the corporate opportunity doctrine does not rest
upon the narrow ground of damage to the corporation, but upon the broad foundation of
public policy which, for the purpose of removing temptation, denies to an insider unjustly
gained enrichment. See Pergament v. Frazier, 93 F. Supp. 13 (E.D. Mich. 1950); Guth v.
Loft, 23 Del. Ch. 255, 5 A.2d 503 (Sup. Ct. 1939); Durfee v. Durfee & Canning, Inc.,
323 Mass. 187, 80 N.E.2d 522 (1948); Knox Glass Bottle Co. v. Underwood, 228 Miss. 699,
89 So. 2d 799 (1956); Weissman v. A. Weissman, Inc., 382 Pa. 189, 114 A.2d 797 (1955);
Lutherland, Inc. v. Dahlen, 357 Pa. 143, 53 A.2d 143 (1947).
1799 N.H. 267, 109 A.2d 558 (1954).
'8323 Mass. 187, 80 N.E.2d 522 (1948).
19 309 Mass. 417, 34 N.E.2d 704 (1941).
2°Presidio Mining Co. v. Overton, 261 Fed. 933 (9th Cir. 1919); Industrial Indem. Co.
v. Golden State Co., 117 Colo. App. 2d 519, 256 P.2d 677 (1953); Rosenblum v. Judson
Eng'r Corp., 99 N.H. 267, 109 A.2d 558 (1954); Litwin v. Allen, 25 N.Y.S.2d 667 (Sup.
Ct. 1940).
1 134 F. Supp. 857 (D. Mo. 1955).
22 See note 4 supra.
2 International Bankers Life Ins. Co. v. Holloway, - Tex. -, 368 S.W.2d 567 (1963),
definitely established that Texas follows the fairness test.
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II. CIRCUMSTANCES AFFECTING THE LIABILITY OF
OFFICERS AND DIRECTORS
Although the facts of each particular case determine whether an
insider has taken advantage of a corporate opportunity, there are,
nevertheless, recurring circumstances of which the courts continually
take notice.
A. Inability Of The Corporation To Avail Itself Of The Opportunity
An insider may take advantage of a business opportunity when
his corporation is definitely unable to do so. Such a situation is not a
corporate opportunity. Therefore, the presence of this factor alone
prevents the application of the doctrine and its constructive trust
remedy."M The inability may be due to many reasons, including
financial. ' There is a split of authority on what constitutes such
24 In Texas, however, such may not be the case, for the Texas Supreme Court in Inter-
national Bankers Life Ins. Co. v. Holloway, supra note 23, appears to have held that the
inability of the corporation to avail itself of an opportunity is just one factor to be used in
determining fairness.
25A corporation may be unable to take advantage of an opportunity for reasons other
than financial. Among these are:
(1) Legal barriers preventing the corporation from taking advantage of an opportunity.
Urban J. Alexander Co. v. Trinkel, 311 Ky. 635, 224 S.W.2d 923 (1949); Jasper Appala-
cian Gas Co., 152 Ky. 68, 153 S.W. 50 (1913); Thilco Timber Co. v. Sawyer, 236 Mich.
401, 210 N.W. 204 (1926); Electric Dev. Co. v. Robson, 140 Neb. 526, 28 N.W.2d 130
(1947).
(2) Settled policy of the corporation not to engage in a partciular line of business. Urban
J. Alexander Co. v. Trinkel, supra; Lancaster Loose Leaf Tobacco Co. v. Robinson, 152 Ky.
68, 250 S.W. 997 (1923); Pioneer Oil & Gas Co. v. Anderson, 168 Miss. 334, 151 So. 161
(1933); Gauger v. Hintz, 262 Wis. 333, 55 N.W.2d 426 (1953); Bump Pump Co. v.
Waukesha Foundry Co., 238 Wis. 643, 300 N.W. 500 (1941).
(3) Transactions beyond the powers of the corporation. Here the primary purpose of
the corporation controls rather than the wide powers and purposes conferred on it by its
charter. Barr v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 57 Fed. 86 (3d Cir. 1893); Urban J. Alexander
Co. v. Trinkel, supra; Diedrick v. Helm, 217 Minn. 483, 14 N.W.2d 913 (1944); Greer
v. Stannard, 85 Mont. 78, 277 Pac. 622 (1929).
(4) Refusal of the party disposing of the opportunity to deal with the corporation.
Bisbee v. Midland Linseed Prod. Co., 19 F.2d 24 (8th Cir. 1927); Urban J. Alexander Co.
v. Trinkel, supra; Pioneer Oil & Gas Co. v. Anderson, supra; Washer v. Seager, 272 App.
Div. 297, 71 N.Y.S.2d 46 (Sup. Ct. 1947); Hauben v. Morris, 255 App. Div. 35, 5 N.Y.S.2d
721 (Sup. Ct. 1938).
(5) Unsuccessful attempts by the corporation to obtain the opportunity. Du Pont v.
Du Pont, 256 Fed. 129 (3d Cir. 1919); Urban J. Alexander Co. v. Trinkel, supra; Seal-O-
Matic Mach. Mfg. Co. v. C. & M. Eng'r & Mfg., Inc., 21 N.J. Super. 311, 91 A.2d 173 (Ch.
1952). An unusual case on the liability of an insider when a corporation is unable to avail
itself of a corporate opportunity is Young v. Columbia Oil Co., 110 W. Va. 364, 158 S.E.
678 (1931). Directors who explored and secured oil lands near their corporation's developed
property were held accountable as fiduciaries for failing to offer the opportunity to the other
shareholders even though the corporation itself was legally unable to take advantage of the op-
portunity. However, this is an unusual case, and the corporate opportunity doctrine does not
require an officer or director to share the opportunity with other shareholders when his cor-
poration is unable to avail itself of the opportunity. Young has been interpreted as holding
that the opportunity must be shared with the shareholders not because of a deprivation of
a corporate opportunity, but because of the unusual circumstances that the information about
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financial inability. Many cases have held that if a corporation, though
solvent, lacks the financial resources to take advantage of the op-
portunity, its directors and officers may take the opportunity for
themselves." Other cases, however, have said that mere lack of finan-
cial resources is not sufficient. Irving Trust v. Deutsch"' stated:
If directors are permitted to justify their conduct on such a theory
[that the corporation is unable to undertake the venture] there will be a
temptation to refrain from exerting their strongest efforts on behalf of
the corporation since, if it does not meet the obligations, an opportunity
for profit will be open to them personally .... Nevertheless, [the facts]
tend to show the wisdom of a rigid rule forbidding the directors of a
solvent corporation to take over for their own profit a corporate con-
tract on the plea of the corporation's financial inability to perform."8
Whether all courts will feel impelled to adopt such a rule of un-
compromising rigidity is doubtful. Regardless of which view of
financial inability is followed, it is held universally that an insider
has no specific duty to use or to loan his own personal funds to assist
the corporation in meeting its financial obligation or to enable it to
take advantage of a business opportunity." Nonetheless, the inability
of a corporation because of a lack of funds may not be relied upon
by its directors if their own lack of diligence was responsible for the
corporation's momentary fiscal condition.'
B. Business Similar To Or Competitive With That Of The Corporation
A director or officer may, without liability, engage in a business
activity similar to or closely associated with the business of his cor-
poration so long as he acts in good faith and does not harm his cor-
poration.31 Good faith competition does not of itself give rise to the
and authority to drill wells on the oil lands were given to the directors specifically for cor-
porate purposes. See Note, Liability of Directors for Taking Corporate Opportunities, Using
Corporate Facilities or Engaging in a Competing Business, 39 Colum. L. Rev. 219 (1939).
" Presidio Mining Co. v. Overton, 261 Fed. 933 (9th Cir. 1919); Urban J. Alexander
Co. v. Trinkel, supra note 25; Hannerty v. Standard Theatre Co., 109 Mo. 397, 19 S.W. 82
(1892); Hauben v. Morris, supra note 25; Green v. Hall, 228 S.W. 183 (Tex. Comm. App.
1921); Gauger v. Hintz, supra note 25.
2773 F.2d 121 (2d Cir. 1934).2 81d. at 124. Accord, Electric Dev. Co. v. Robson, 140 Neb. 526, 28 N.W.2d 130
(1947).
2Urban J. Alexander Co. v. Trinkel, 311 Ky. 635, 224 S.W.2d 923 (1949); Hart v.
Bell, 222 Minn. 69, 23 N.W.2d 375 (1946), noted in 2 U. Chi. L. Rev. 323 (1935); Green
v. Hall, 228 S.W. 183 (Tex. Comm. App. 1921).
a0 Daloisio v. Peninsula Land Co., 43 N.J. Super. 79, 127 A.2d 885 (Ch. 1956).
a Red Top Cab Co. v. Hanchett, 48 F.2d 236 (N.D. Colo. 1931); American Inv. Co. v.
Lichtenstein, 134 F. Supp. 857 (E.D. Mo. 1955); McKinistry v. Thomas, 258 Ala. 690, 64
So. 2d 808 (1953); Raines v. Toney, 228 Ark. 1170, 313 S.W.2d 802 (1958); New v. New,
148 Colo. App. 2d 372, 306 P.2d 987 (1957); Industrial Indem. Co. v. Golden State Co.,
117 Colo. App. 2d 519, 256 P.2d 677 (1953); Hall v. Dekker, 45 Colo. App. 2d 783, 115
P.2d 15 (1941); Guth v. Loft, 23 Del. Ch. 255, 5 A.2d 503 (Sup. Ct. 1939); Urban J.
Alexander Co. v. Trinkel, 311 Ky. 635, 224 S.W.2d 923 (1949); Coleman v. Hanger, 210
1964]
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corporate opportunity doctrine and is of very little weight in the
equitable balancing process of the "fairness test."
C. Prior Negotiations By The Corporation For The Opportunity
Will the fact that an insider personally acquired an opportunity
for which his corporation had been negotiating invoke the doctrine?
In De Bardeleben v. Bessemer Land & Improvement Co., 2 the presi-
dent of a corporation spent a large amount of the corporation's
money in prospecting and exploring coal land and in acquiring leases
on the land. He then took one of the leases in his own name. The
court applied the corporate opportunity doctrine in this case, but
the decision was based on the spending of corporate funds, not the
fact of negotiations.
In Pioneer Oil El Gas Co. v. Anderson," a corporation was negoti-
ating for the purchase of certain properties which its officers later
acquired for themselves. The court said that the fact of negotiations
by the corporation was not sufficient to cause the corporate oppor-
tunity doctrine to apply, particularly since other factors demonstrat-
ing the fairness of the acquisition by the officers were present. In
Colorado & Utah Coal Co. v. Harris,' the court refused to apply the
corporate opportunity doctrine, even though negotiations for the op-
portunity by the corporation had occurred, because other factors out-
weighed the negotiations. Furthermore, in Beatty v. Guggenheim
Exploration Co.,3" the court held that an officer who was sent by the
corporation to determine the advisability of purchasing a business
opportunity was not barred from acquiring it for himself at a later
date by that fact alone. The result of these cases is that negotiation
by the corporation for an opportunity acquired by insiders will
not in itself cause the doctrine to apply. The case against an insider
is, however, stronger if negotiation is present.
Ky. 309, 275 S.W. 784 (1925); Lincoln Stores, Inc. v. Grant, 309 Mass. 417, 34 N.E.2d 704
(1941); Greer v. Stannard, 85 Mont. 78, 277 Pac. 622 (1929). Pioneer Oil & Gas Co. v.
Anderson, 168 Miss. 334, 151 So. 161 (1933), states that no problem arises over a director or
officer competing with his corporation when he has previously reserved a personal right to en-
gage in transactions in which his corporation would normally be interested. A more restrictive
view is set forth in Fuller, supra note 9, at 209. He states that some limitation exists where
a director of one corporation desires to become affiliated in a managerial or directoral position
with an already organized, competitive corporation; the reason is that if a director is
allowed to affiliate in such a manner, the director would be in the impossible position of
impartially serving two masters with diametrically opposed interests. Such an affiliation is
proper if a majority of the shareholders of his corporation consent to the director's action by
re-electing him as a director with knowledge of his connection with their corporation's com-
petitor.
as 14 0 Ala. 621, 37 So. 511 (1904).
3 168 Miss. 334, 151 So. 161 (1933).
497 Colo. 309, 49 P.2d 429 (1935).
as167 App. Div. 864, 153 N.Y.S. 757 (Sup. Ct. 1915).
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D. Opportunity Extended To The Corporation Or To Insider
Ostensibly Acting For The Corporation
Although negotiation by the corporation is not sufficient to cause
a corporate opportunity to arise, if an officer or director personally
acquires an opportunity while ostensibly negotiating or acquiring the
opportunity for his corporation, a different result will occur. An
officer or director cannot divert to his own favor the benefit of an
opportunity extended to the corporation directly" or to him as a
fiduciary of his corporation." The court, in Litwin v. Allen," stated
that this latter circumstance imposes a mandate to buy for the cor-
poration. 9 Several other cases have placed liability on a director or
officer for taking an opportunity for himself while representing that
he was acting for his corporation.' In addition, liability may be
found even if an opportunity is offered to a director or officer in his
individual capacity when other factors indicating deprivation of a
corporate opportunity are present."1
E. Knowledge Of The Opportunity By Virtue Of The
Corporate Fiduciary Position
Litwin v. Allen41 stated that an insider acquires for the benefit of
the corporation if he takes an opportunity which he discovered
through the corporation and which the corporation had contemplated
and desired. 3 There were other factors in the case weighing strongly
in favor of application of the doctrine, however, and other cases have
followed a less rigid rule." Colorado & Utah Coal Co. v. Harris
45
'Pioneer Oil & Gas Co. v. Anderson, 168 Miss. 334, 151 So. 161 (1933). See also Albert
H. Volk Co. v. Fleschner Bros. Inc., 298 App. Div. 717, 60 N.Y.S.2d 244 (Sup. Ct. 1945).
Accord, Chicago Flexolite Floor Co. v. Lane, 188 Minn. 422, 247 N.W. 517 (1933).
" Litwin v. Allen, 25 N.Y.S.2d 667 (Sup. Ct. 1940).
a' Ibid.
" The mandate may also arise by the fact that a director or officer had undertaken to
negotiate in the field on behalf of the corporation. Ibid.
"°Central Railroad Signal Co. v. Langden, 194 F.2d 310 (7th Cir. 1952); Melgard v.
Moscow Idaho Seed Co., 73 Idaho 265, 251 P.2d 546 (1952).
" Austrian v. Williams, 103 F. Supp. 64 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd on other grounds, 198 F.2d
697 (2d Cir. 1952); Greene v. Allen, 114 A.2d 916 (Del. Ch. 1955); Gottlieb v. McKee,
107 A.2d 240 (Del. Ch. 1954); Rosenblum v. Judson Eng'r Corp., 99 N.H. 267, 109 A.2d
558 (1954); Blaustein v. Pan American Petroleum & Transp. Co., 293 N.Y. 281, 56 N.E.2d
705 (1944).
42 25 N.Y.S.2d 667 (Sup. Ct. 1940).
'The same result occurred in Tierney v. United Pocohontas Coal Co., 85 W. Va. 545,
102 S.E. 249 (1920).
"In Nebraska Power Co. v. Koenig, 93 Neb. 39, 139 N.W. 839 (1913), the court came
close to deciding that a corporate opportunity was created by the acquisition of knowledge
of the opportunity through being a director. But there were also the additional important
factors that the corporation had expended considerable money in securing the knowledge and
that, if the director were allowed to take the opportunity, his corporation's investment would
be destroyed.
4197 Colo. 309, 49 P.2d 429 (1935).
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and Diedrick v. Helm" demonstrate that if other factors are not pres-
ent mere knowledge of an opportunity by an insider through his cor-
porate position will not invoke the doctrine."
F. Disclosure Of The Opportunity To The Corporation
Affirmative disclosure to the corporation before acquisition for
himself is an important factor in freeing an insider from liability."
On the other hand, failure to disclose, although not conclusive, is said
to be an extremely significant factor in establishing liability under
the corporate opportunity doctrine."9 It appears wise, therefore, for
an insider to disclose the business opportunity to his corporation be-
fore acquiring it personally if such acquisition raises the slightest in-
ference of a corporate opportunity.
G. Rejection Of The Opportunity By The Corporation
If a corporation, through a disinterested or nondominated board
of directors, refuses to take a business opportunity, the officers and
directors may take it.5" Rejection is no defense, of course, if it is
induced by fraud or misrepresentation." Furthermore, in a domina-
tion situation, whether or not the board has a nondominated minor-
ity can be of significance. Although the cases provide no clear an-
swer, the following theories are submitted for use if a nondominated
minority can be identified:
(1) If the minority constitutes a substantial portion of the board
(i.e., one-third) and unanimously joins in the vote to release the
corporation's prior claim to the opportunity, either of two rules
reasonably might be followed:
46217 Minn. 483, 14 N.W.2d 913 (1944).
" See also Melgard v. Moscow Idaho Seed Co., 73 Idaho 265, 251 P.2d 546 (1952), and
Pikes Peak Co. v. Pfunter, 158 Mich. 412, 123 N.W. 19 (1909). The same view is set forth
in Note, Liability of Directors for Taking Corporate Opportunities, Using Corporate Facilities,
or Engaging in a Comnpeting Business, 39 Colum. L. Rev. 219 (1939).
48 Mayflower Hotel Stock Protective Comm. v. Mayflower Hotel Corp., 193 F.2d 666
(D.C. Cir. 1951); Columbus Outdoor Advertising Co. v. Harris, 127 F.2d 38 (6th Cir.
1942); Cowell v. McMillan, 177 Fed. 25 (9th Cir. 1910); Paddock v. Simoneit, 147 Tex.
571, 218 S.W.2d 428 (1949).4 9 Loewer v. Lonoke Rice Milling Co., 111 Ark. 62, 161 S.W. 1042 (1913), held that an
ofcer-director had no right to set up an interest in a purchase antagonistic to the corporation
nor to make a profit on it for himself without the knowledge and consent of the other
directors. See also Central Railroad Signal Co. v. Longden, 194 F.2d 310 (7th Cir. 1952);
Farwell v. Pyle-National Headlight Co., 289 Il1. 157, 124 N.W. 449 (1919); Production
Mach. Co. v. Howe, 327 Mass. 372, 99 N.E.2d 32 (1951); Kelley v. 74 & 76 West Tremont
Ave. Corp., 4 Misc. 2d 533, 151 N.Y.S.2d 900 (Sup. Ct. 1956).
so Cowell v. McMillan, 177 Fed. 25 (9th Cir. 1910); Barr v. Pittsburg Plate Glass Co.,
57 Fed. 86 (3d Cir. 1893); Loewer v. Lonoke Rice Milling Co., 111 Ark. 62, 161 S.W.
1042 (1913); McKee v. Brazell, 99 Okla. 36, 225 Pac. 520 (1924); Comment, 74 Harv.
L. Rev. 765 (1961).




(a) The minority's concurrence is a sufficient guarantee that
good faith business judgment has been exercised.
(b) The insider has no absolute defense, but anyone alleging
improper appropriation has the burden of proving that the board
acted in bad faith.
(2) If the nondominated minority is unsubstantial or is not
unanimous for release, the presumption of good faith disappears, and
the dominating officer or director would have the burden of showing
good faith rejection by the board.
As mentioned above, these theories are not established by case au-
thority. The only case in this area is Greene v. Allen," in which a
stockholder brought a derivative action against the corporation and
its president, Odlum, (who was also a director and substantial stock-
holder) for an accounting by him of profits realized through his pur-
chase of certain patents that were previously rejected by the corpora-
tion. The evidence showed that Odlum dominated the board of direc-
tors. The court held that if an opportunity comes to a corporation and
it is rejected for "business judgment" reasons, a person in Odlum's
fiduciary relationship to a corporation is disqualified from taking it
for himself. Otherwise those to whom the fiduciary duty is owed
would very seldom be able to prove bad faith because "business judg-
ment" is essentially a subjective evaluation by the directors.
Greene v. Allen" appears to establish the following rules for a
situation in which there is no substantial, unanimous nondominated
minority present:
(1) If a dominated board rejects the opportunity through the
exercise of "business judgment" (i.e., a rejection for reasons other than
inability of the corporation to acquire the opportunity) the domi-
nating individual normally cannot take the opportunity. However,
another insider would probably be allowed to take it. 4
" 114 A.2d 916 (Del. Ch. 1955). An earlier case, Turner v. American Metal Co., 268
App. Div. 239, 50 N.Y.S.2d 800 (Sup. Ct. 1944), briefly discussed a "business judgment"
rejection. A large percentage of a speculative mining venture was acquired by directors after
rejecting the possibility of acquiring all but seven per cent of it for their corporation. The
court held that because of the highly speculative nature of the venture the directors had
exercised honest "business judgment" in their decision and, therefore, were entitled to acquire
the venture for themselves. The board of directors in this case, however, was not dominated,
and the court specifically mentions that it was disinterested; therefore, the case is not in
conflict with Greene v. Allen. It is puzzling, however, that the court considered the board
of directors disinterested in light of the fact that they personally acquired the opportunity
after rejecting most of it for their corporation.
"3 114 A.2d 916 (Del. Ch. 1955), noted in 44 Geo. L.J. 526 (1956); 54 Mich. L. Rev.
561 (1956) (critical of case); 31 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 403 (1956); 28 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 419
(1956); 24 U. Cinc. L. Rev. 588 (1955); 104 U. Pa. L. Rev. 424 (1955) (critical of case).
"When a dominated board of directors rejects an opportunity in the exercise of business
judgment, the question remains whether Greene v. Allen holds that only the dominating
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(2) If the dominating individual sustains the burden of proving
that the directors acted in good faith in the rejection, there is a
strong possibility that he will be allowed to acquire the opportunity."'
(3) If rejection is for a reason other than exercise of business judg-
ment, e.g., illegality, financial inability, etc., the dominating indi-
vidual will be allowed to take the opportunity.
H. Use Of Corporate Facilities By An Insider To Acquire
The Opportunity
It has been said that use of any corporate facility-including funds,
credit, property, or information gained through insider status--causes
the corporate opportunity doctrine to apply."s The corporation,
having become involved in the venture, is said to have the right to
any benefit resulting from such a transaction. Another position has
been taken, however, that if the corporate facilities involved are
minor, the use of them is inconclusive evidence of a corporate oppor-
tunity situation." The corporation may be unaware of the existence
of the opportunity, disinterested in it at the time it arises, or involved
only to the slightest extent; or the opportunity may be wholly un-
related to the corporation's business. Under these circumstances it
may not be unfair to allow an insider to take the opportunity.
If there is an unauthorized use of corporate funds or corporate
credit by an insider to acquire or develop an opportunity, this fact
alone invokes the corporate opportunity doctrine, even though the
funds were employed in a manner unavailable to the corporation."
The insider must account to the corporation for all profits, regardless
of how disproportionate they may be to the amount of corporate
funds used."9 This is the general rule for misuse of funds by a trus-
insider cannot take the opportunity or that no fiduciary may take the opportunity. It seems
that the court intended the holding to apply only to individuals who control the board, for
the court speaks of "a person in Odium's fiduciary relationship" and states that "at least in
this limited situation . . . " the rule applies.
s Dictum in the case appears to modify the rule that a dominating insider cannot take
an opportunity rejected for "business judgment" reasons to allow the dominating individual
a defense if he can prove good faith rejection. The court raised this question, but then
disposed of it by saying that Odium failed to sustain the burden of proving good faith.
56 Comment, 26 Fordham L. Rev. 528 (1957).
" Note, Liability of Directors for Taking Corporate Opportunities, Using Corporate Fa-
cilities, or Engaging in a Competing Business, 39 Colum. L. Rev. 219, 227-30 (1939). This
position was based on the expectancy test. However, it would be sound even under the fair-
ness test.5 Backus v. Finkelstein, 23 F.2d 357 (D. Minn. 1927), appeal dismissed, 31 F.2d 1011
(8th Cir. 1929); De Bardeleben v. Bessemer Land & Improvement Co., 140 Ala. 621, 37
So. 511 (1904); Johnston v. Greene, 33 Del. Ch. 508, 121 A.2d 919 (Eq. 1956); Brom-
schwig v. Carthage Marble & White Lime Co., 334 Mo. 319, 66 S.W.2d 889 (1933); Gilmore
v. Gilmore Drug Co., 279 Pa. 193, 123 At. 730 (1924); Hazard v. Durant, 14 R.I. 25
(1882); Sparks v. McCraw, 112 S.C. 519, 100 S.E. 161 (1919).
" Backus v. Finkelstein, supra note 58; Bromschwig v. Carthage Marble & White Lime
Co., supra note 58; Sparks v. McCraw, supra note 58.
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tee." The insider may, however, in the absence of fraud or statutory
prohibition, borrow funds from his corporation with which to pur-
chase a business opportunity, and the fact of borrowing would prob-
ably be of little weight in a court's determination of whether to
apply the doctrine." On the other hand, if an insider obtains cor-
porate funds without being obligated to furnish security and pay
interest, then the opportunity is said to be held in constructive trust
for the corporation by virtue of the doctrine."2
I. Acquisition By An Insider Of Stock In His Own Corporation
The fact that an insider has dealt in or made a profit on the out-
standing stock of his corporation normally will not give rise to the
corporate opportunity doctrine. An insider has the right to buy and
sell the stock unless facts exist that make the transaction inequitable
against the corporation or the other shareholders."3 For instance, the
Texas Supreme Court recently found a deprivation of corporate op-
portunity in a situation in which insiders sold their previously acquired
stock in their corporation in competition with the sale by their cor-
poration of newly authorized stock."
An interesting example of an equitable purchase of stock of their
own corporation by directors was presented in Hauben v. Morris."2
Several directors of a corporation bought its outstanding stock and
later resold it to the corporation at a profit. At the time of the direc-
tors' purchase, the corporation was not negotiating for the purchase
of the stock, was not seeking to reduce its capital stock, and lacked
sufficient assets to make the purchase itself. The court held that there
was no mandate on the directors to buy the stock for their corpora-
tion. In Adams v. Midwest Chevrolet Corp.,"s a stockholder offered
60 See note 57 supra.
61Paddock v. Simoneit, 147 Tex. 571, 218 S.W.2d 428 (1949). An important factor in
this case, however, was that the stockholders and principal creditors of the corporation
knew of and approved the loan.
62 Upson v. Otis, 155 F.2d 606 (2d Cir. 1946).
"
5 Bisbee v. Midland Linseed Prod. Co., 19 F.2d 24 (8th Cir. 1927); Du Pont v.
Du Pont, 256 Fed. 129 (3d Cir. 1919); Lewin v. New York Ambassador, Inc., 61 N.Y.S.2d
492 (Sup. Ct. 1946), aff'd, 271 App. Div. 927, 67 N.Y.S.2d 706 (App. T. 1947); Hauben
v. Morris, 255 App. Div. 35, 5 N.Y.S.2d 721 (Sup. Ct. 1938); Adams v. Mid-West Chevro-
let Corp., 198 Okla. 461, 179 P.2d 147 (1946). In Bisbee, the court mentioned fact situa-
tions of this nature, e.g., when a director or officer has been employed by the corporation to
buy the stock for it, or when he has made a wrongful use of his position or influence or
the money, property or credit of his corporation to acquire stock which the corporation
desires to buy for itself. Whether the corporation is desirous of buying its own stock, how-
ever, is determined not by the court but by the board of directors of the corporation. Such
a situation would also be present where the corporation was attempting to reduce its capital
stock.
"International Bankers Life Ins. Co. v. Holloway, - Tex. __, 368 S.W.2d 567
(1963).
6' 255 App. Div. 35, 5 N.Y.S.2d 721 (Sup. Ct. 1938).
6' 198 Okla. 461, 179 P.2d 147 (1946).
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to sell the president-director a great amount of stock at a favor-
able price and on terms for which the stock ordinarily could not be
purchased. The president took the opportunity in his individual ca-
pacity without disclosure to his corporation, although it was capable
of purchasing and its charter contemplated that it might purchase its
own stock. The court upheld the president's purchase of the stock."
Allowing an insider to deal in the stock of his corporation without
fear of the corporate opportunity doctrine, except in exceptionally
inequitable situations, is a sound rule. An insider's duty as trustee
with respect to the business and property of his corporation does not
extend to its outstanding stock, for the stock is the individual prop-
erty of the respective stockholders and is not in any sense property of
the corporation." The corporation as such has no interest in the out-
standing stock or in dealings between the stockholders with respect
to it. Each stockholder has the right to buy stock in the corporation
or to sell his stock as he sees fit, and no stockholder or group of
stockholders has any pecuniary interest in the stock of others or in
any gain or loss that may be realized or sustained by others in dealing
with or disposing of their stock.
J. Acquisition By An Insider Of Obligations Owed By
His Corporation To Third Persons
A corporate opportunity may arise if an insider acquires claims
owed by his own company. Ownership of such obligations could well
give rise to a clash between the personal interests of the claimholder
and those of the debtor-corporation. For example, in such instances
" The corporate opportunity doctrine was applied in this area in an unusual way in
Dunett v. Arn, 71 F.2d 912 (10th Cir. 1934). Defendants were officers and controlling
stockholders of corporation A. Corporation B desired an oil lease held by corporation A, but
A wanted more money for the lease than B was willing to pay. The defendants sold their
stock to B and also induced the minority stockholders to sell their stock to B for less than
the price received by them, although the minority stockholders were not aware of this. B
then owned A and was able to obtain the lease. The court held that under the facts of the
case the sale of stock to B was in substance a sale by A of its assets which was a corporate
transaction and that an insider may not profit or acquire any personal benefit in a corporate
transaction not shared by the other stockholders. The court then stated that a stockholder
of a corporation has a right to buy and sell its stock and to keep the profits therefrom, even
though he is a managing officer of the corporation, but that officers cannot, under cover
of this rule, carry through a transaction such as appears in this case, which is in essence the
diversion to themselves of a part of the price corporation B paid for the property of cor-
poration A. The court also stated that there was a conflict of authority in this area of the
law. The majority rule, according to the court, is that since dealing in its own stock is
not a corporate function, the officers and directors of a corporation do not occupy a fiduciary
relationship to the stockholder with respect to his shares in the corporation, whereas the
minority rule makes an officer or director a trustee of the individual stockholders with respect
to their stock in the corporation. The court did not base its holding on either of these rules,
for it stated that the question was not presented in the case.
" Bisbee v. Midland Linseed Prod. Co., 19 F.2d 24 (8th Cir. 1927); Keely v. Black, 91
N.J. Eq. 520, 111 Atl. 22 (Ch. 1920); Adams v. Mid-West Chevrolet Corp., 198 Okla. 461,
179 P.2d 147 (1946).
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the corporation could buy the obligations before maturity at a dis-
count; however, the insider could allow them to be held to maturity
to enforce their payment at full face value. Furthermore, it may be to
the corporation's advantage to obtain an extension of the debt at
maturity, but an insider who owns such a claim might prefer to press
for immediate payment.
1. Purchase of Claims at Par Unless the circumstances surrounding
the transaction make it inequitable" or unless a statute forbids,70 an
insider may purchase liquidated obligations of his corporation at par
and enforce the same against the corporation to the extent of the
money actually paid plus legal interest thereon. 7' He is entitled to
enforce the claim according to its tenor even though the opportunity
for its acquisition was not first offered to the debtor."" The reason
could well be that the director or officer purchasing a company
obligation at par obtains no profit at the expense of the debtor when
the obligation is paid and that company creditors from whom the
purchase was made receive the face amount of their claim. Moreover,
the corporation may benefit from such a purchase not only as a result
of the additional stake which the director thereby obtains in the busi-
ness, but also through the obvious advantage accruing from the
general public knowledge that corporate insiders have sufficient faith
in the corporation's future to put their money into its obligations.
2. Purchase of Claims Below Par If the claim was purchased at less
than par, a significantly different problem is presented. Some cases
strongly indicate that an insider is absolutely precluded from collect-
ing from his company more than he paid for the claim."3 In these
cases, the courts use an analogy to trust law which prevents the
trustee from profiting from the purchase of trust obligations." For
" Martin v. Chambers, 214 Fed. 769 (5th Cir. 1914); Bellaire Sec. Corp. v. Brown, 124
Fla. 47, 168 So. 625, 640 (1936).
"°Weissman v. A. Weissman, Inc., 374 Pa. 470, 97 A.2d 870 (1953); Fowler v. Iowa
Land Co., 18 S.D. 131, 99 N.W. 1095 (1904).
71 Monroe v. Scofield, 135 F.2d 725 (10th Cir. 1943); Kroegher v. Calivada Colonization
Co., 119 Fed. 641 (3d Cir. 1902); Ripperger v. Allyn, 25 F. Supp. 554 (S.D.N.Y. 1938);
In r'e McCrory Stores Corp., 12 F. Supp. 267 (S.D.N.Y. 1935); Solimine v. Hollander, 128
N.J. Eq. 228, 16 A.2d 203 (Ch. 1940); Hauben v. Morris, 255 App. Div. 35, 5 N.Y.S.2d
721 (Sup. Ct. 1938); Weissman v. A. Weissman, Inc., 382 Pa. 189, 114 A.2d 797 (1953).
'2 Ibld.
'Martin v. Chambers, 214 Fed. 769 (5th Cir. 1914); Davis v. The Rock Creek L.F.
& M. Co., 55 Cal. 359 (1880); Bramblet v. Commonwealth Land & Lumber Co., 27 Ky. L.
Rep. 156, 84 S.W. 545 (Ct. App. 1905); The Chateau Ins. Co. v. Floyd, 74 Mo. 286
(1881); Lingle v. National Ins. Co., 45 Mo. 109 (1869); Brewster v. Stratman, 4 Mo. App.
41 (1877); McDonald v. Haughton, 70 N.C. 393 (1874); Duncomb v. New York H. & N.
Ry., 84 N.Y. 190 (1881); Hill v. Frazier, 22 Pa. 320 (1853); Moulton v. Connell-Hall-
McLester Co., 93 Tenn. 377, 27 S.W. 672 (1894).
743 Fletcher, Private Corporations 869 (repl. ed. 1947); 1 Perry, Trusts 712 (7th ed.
1929); Fuller, supra note 9; Scott, The Trustee's Duty of Loyalty, 49 Harv. L. Rev. 521
(1936).
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instance, if an insider purchases a claim against his corporation when
it was his express or implied duty to purchase for the corporation
(i.e., to pay the claim with corporate funds) then the insider cannot
profit by such a purchase."5 Furthermore, he may not enforce claims
bought at a discount for their face value if such claims were acquired
pursuant to a resolution of the board of directors that guaranteed his
repayment."8 Moreover, he may not require the full face value of
such discounted claims if a specific fund for their purchase has been
set up by his corporation or a special liquidation has been ordered."
It has also been held that an insider may not profit on such claims if
the directors who consented to the purchase intentionally failed to
provide the means for the corporation to take care of such claims
when it was well able to do so."s In addition, an insider may not take
advantage of the corporation during its insolvency by purchasing
claims at a discount and enforcing such claims at their full face value."9
Of course, if the corporation is unable to make the purchase, " al-
though not insolvent,"' or if it has decided to do nothing about debt
retirement before maturity, the acquisition of the claims below par
will be unobjectionable."s Furthermore, in spite of these restrictions,
the general rule appears to be that an insider may make a good faith
purchase of claims at a discount and enforce them at their face value. "3
"'Monroe v. Scofield, 135 F.2d 725 (10th Cir. 1943); Mothershead v. Douglas, 215
Ark. 519, 221 S.W.2d 424 (1949); Todd v. Temple Hosp. Ass'n, 96 Cal. App. 42, 273
Pac. 595 (Dist. Ct. App. 1939); Wabunga Land Co. v. Scheanbeck, 245 Mich. 505, 222
N.W. 707 (1929); Weissman v. A. Weissman, Inc., 382 Pa. 189, 114 A.2d 797 (1953).
"' Kroegher v. Calivada Colonization Co., 119 Fed. 641 (3d Cir. 1902).
"Seymour v. Spring Forrest Cemetery Ass'n, 144 N.Y. 333, 39 N.E. 365 (1895) (this
case also held that no duty rests on an officer or director to purchase the claims for his
corporation unless a specific fund has been ordered). In Young v. Columbia Land & Inv.
Co., 53 Ore. 438, 99 Pac. 936 (1909), it was held that controlling directors violated their
fiduciary duties by taking claims originally offered to their corporation even though the
latter had no plan for their acquisition.
" Young v. Columbia Land & Inv. Co., supra note 77; Fuller, supra note 9.
9 1n re Bridgford Co., 237 F.2d 182 (9th Cir. 1956); Monroe v. Scofield, 135 F.2d 725
(10th Cir. 1943); In re Philadelphia & Western Ry., 64 F. Supp. 738 (E.D. Pa. 1946);
In re Los Angeles Lumber Prod. Co., 46 F. Supp. 77 (S.D. Cal. 1941); In re McCrory
Stores Corp., 12 F. Supp. 267 (S.D.N.Y. 1935); Mothershead v. Douglas, 215 Ark. 519,
221 S.W.2d 424 (1949); Bonney v. Tilley, 109 Cal. 346, 42 Pac. 439 (1895); Meinhard
v. Salmon, 249 N.Y. 458, 164 N.E. 545 (1928).
" Punch v. Hipolite Co., 340 Mo. 53, 100 S.W.2d 878 (1936); Glenwood Mfg. Co. v.
Lyme, 109 Wis. 355, 85 N.W. 432 (1901); Fuller, supra note 9, at 198.
" An interesting problem in this area is presented by Irving Trust Co. v. Deutsch, 73
F.2d 121 (2d Cir. 1934), which states that for financial inability to be a defense in cor-
porate opportunity situations the corporation has to be more than unable to acquire the op-
portunity, it must be insolvent. However, an officer or director cannot purchase at a dis-
count and enforce for the full amount the claims against his corporation when it is insolvent.
8 Du Pont v. Du Pont, 256 Fed. 129 (3d Cir. 1916); Sandy River R.R. v. Stubbs, 77
Me. 594 (1885); Thilco Timber Co. v. Sawyer, 236 Mich. 401, 210 N.W. 204 (1926).
83 Manufacturers Trust Co. v. Becker, 338 U.S. 304 (1949); In re Calton Crescent, Inc.,
173 F.2d 944 (2d Cir. 1949); Monroe v. Scofield, 135 F.2d 725 (10th Cir. 1943); In re
Philadelphia & Western Ry., 64 F. Supp. 738 (E.D. Pa. 1946); In re McCrory Stores Corp.,
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III. BURDEN OF PROOF IN CORPORATE OPPORTUNITY SITUATIONS
As previously discussed, there is no concrete test for determining
the existence of a corporate opportunity. Its existence is determined
by the dictates of fairness in light of the circumstances in each case.
The vagueness of the test makes the burden of proof unusually im-
portant. There is, however, no universal rule for placing the burden
of proof in corporate opportunity situations.
If contracts or other direct dealings between an insider and his
corporation are challenged as a deprivation of a corporate oppor-
tunity, the burden is on the insider not only to prove his own good
faith, but also to show the inherent fairness of the transaction to the
corporation," i.e., to show that it was not unfair for the insider to
take the opportunity personally. This is, in essence, a showing of the
nonexistence of a corporate opportunity. Furthermore, if the chal-
lenged transaction is between corporations having one or more com-
mon members on their board of directors, the burden of proof is also
upon those who would maintain the transaction to show its entire
fairness; sa this situation is similar to direct dealing with his corpora-
tion by a director.
A different allocation of the burden of proof occurs if a domi-
nating director or officer personally takes an opportunity after his
corporation, through a dominated board of directors, has rejected it
for "business judgment" reasons. Here, the party attacking the acqui-
sition has the burden of proving that the director or officer dominates
or controls the board of directors." The dominance cannot be shown
merely by the fact that the defendant owns enough stock to have the
controlling interest in the corporation, that the defendant takes a
vigorous interest in the affairs of the corporation, or that the defen-
dant's views are strongly considered by the remaining officers or
12 F. Supp. 267 (S.D.N.Y. 1935); Todd v. Temple Hosp. Ass'n, 96 Cal. App. 42, 273
Pac. 595 (Dist. Ct. App. 1929); Alexandrine Hotel Co. v. Whaling, 313 Mich. 15, 20
N.W.2d 793 (1945); Camden Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Citizens' Ice & Cold Storage Co.,
69 N.J. Eq. 718, 61 At. 529 (Ch. 1905), aff'd, 71 N.J. Eq. 221, 65 At. 980 (Ch. 1907);
Inglehart v. Thousand Island Hotel Co., 32 Hun. 377 (N.Y. 1884); William M. Moore
Constr. Co. v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 293 N.Y. 119, 56 N.E.2d 74 (1944); Sey-
mour v. Spring Forrest Cemetery Ass'n, 144 N.Y. 333, 39 N.E. 365 (1895).
84 Chenery Corp. v. SEC, 128 F.2d 303 (D.C. Cir. 1942); Lebold v. Inland Steel Co.,
125 F.2d 369 (7th Cir. 1941); Austrian v. Williams, 103 F. Supp. 64 (S.D.N.Y. 1952),
rev'd on other grounds, 198 F.2d 697 (2d Cir. 1952); Maclary v. Pleasant Hills, Inc., 109
A.2d 830 (Del. Ch. 1954); Knox Glass Bottle Co. v. Underwood, 228 Miss. 699, 89 So. 2d
799 (1956).
" Geddes v. Anaconda Copper Mining Co., 254 U.S. 590 (1920); Mayflower Hotel Stock
Protective Comm. v. Mayflower Hotel Corp., 193 F.2d 666 (D.C. Cir. 1951); Pergament
v. Frazier, 93 F. Supp. 13 (E.D. Mich. 1950).
" Austrian v. Williams, 103 F. Supp. 64 (S.D.N.Y. 1952), rev'd on other grounds, 198
F.2d 697 (2d Cir. 1952); Mayer v. Adams, 167 A.2d 729 (Del. Ch. 1961); Greene v. Al-
len, 114 A.2d 916 (Del. Ch. 1955) (by implication); Note, 45 Calif. L. Rev. 183 (1957).
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directors of the corporation." However, once domination is shown
by the plaintiff, then the dominating individual has the burden of
showing a good faith rejection of the opportunity by the board of
directors."
Still another allocation of the burden of proof occurs in situations
other than (1) acquisition of an opportunity by a dominating indi-
vidual after a rejection for "business judgment" reasons by the direc-
tors or (2) direct dealing situations. The burden here is upon the
person attacking the acquisition, not upon the acquiring insider. The
validity of this proposition is apparent from the holdings of many
courts that the evidence presented in the cases before them was in-
sufficient to establish that the particular acquisition was a corporate
opportunity. "' Moreover, the courts in Colorado & Utah Coal Co. v.
Harris" and in American Investment Co. v. Lichtenstein"1 expressly
stated that in these situations the burden was upon the party attack-
ing the transaction." One exception to this proposition has recently
been created by the Texas Supreme Court in International Bankers
Life Ins. Co. v. Holloway." In placing the burden of proof on the
insiders in a situation in which the insiders sold their previously ac-
quired stock in their corporation in competition with a sale by their
corporation of newly authorized shares, the court stated:
We agree with the defendants that only under special circumstances
should stockholders who are also corporate fiduciaries have the burden
of proving fairness to the corporation in the sales by them of their per-
sonally owned stock, or presumptively become liable for profits made in
such sales. This is a case of such special circumstances. Here the interests
87 Austrian v. Williams, supra note 86.
"SAn interesting result was reached in Turner v. American Metal Co., 268 App. Div.
239, 50 N.Y.S.2d 800 (Sup. Ct. 1944), which involved a dominated board of directors. A
great portion of a mining venture was taken by the directors and officers of a corporation
after the directors had exercised their "business judgment" in rejecting it for their corpora-
tion because of its highly speculative nature. The court held that the directors and officers
were entitled to the mining venture. It said that in the absence of proof that disinterested
directors acted in bad faith the court may not presume they were not guided by sound busi-
ness reasons. The case, therefore, demonstrates that when the opportunity is rejected by a
nondominated board of directors, the burden of proving a bad faith rejection rests upon
the party attacking the acquisition, rather than placing a burden of proving a good faith
rejection on the party acquiring the opportunity. Furthermore, the party attacking the
acquisition has the burden of proving a bad faith rejection even where members of the re-
jecting board of directors acquire the opportunity for themselves personally, for the court
considers such directors as disinterested.
"9Kahn v. Schiff, 105 F. Supp. 973 (S.D. Ohio 1952); Greer v. Stannard, 85 Mont. 78,
277 Pac. 622 (1929); Tierney v. United Pocahontas Coal Co., 85 W. Va. 545, 102 S.E.
249 (1920).
"97 Colo. 309, 49 P.2d 429 (1935).
91134 F. Supp. 857 (N.D. Mo. 1955).
"See also Outjes v. MacNider, 232 Iowa 562, 5 N.W.2d 860 (1942) (burden is on the
party seeking imposition of a constructive trust).
93 Tex. -, 368 S.W.2d 567 (1963).
[Vol. 18
COMMENTS
of the corporation justly called for protection by the defendants of the
opportunities for the sale of the stock of the corporation; they were
under a duty to act in all respects to further the purposes of the cor-
poration in offering its stock for sale and cannot seize the opportunities
for themselves."
IV. LIABILITY OF SHAREHOLDER
An ordinary shareholder, for purposes of the corporate oppor-
tunity doctrine, is treated differently from a director or officer.
Ownership and management are divorced in the modern corporation.
Most stockholders do not occupy strategic corporate positions through
which they can obtain profitable opportunities at the expense of their
corporation. Furthermore, stockholders are not in a fiduciary relation-
ship to their corporation such as to impose upon them a duty of
loyalty toward their corporation. Therefore, in the absence of their
domination or usurpation of the functions of the board of directors,
thereby making themselves responsible for the action or inaction of
the directors, there should be no shareholder liability under the cor-
porate opportunity doctrine."
V. SIMILAR LIABILITY FOR DIRECTOR AND OFFICER
Liability of both officers and directors appears to be the same under
the doctrine of corporate opportunity. 6 Many cases use the words
"directors and officers" in discussions of the duty not to divert a
corporate opportunity, thereby implying that the same duty and the
same liability attaches to both.9 ' In several cases, some defendants were
officers and others were merely directors, but the courts did not find
it necessary to distinguish between the two positions."
94 Id. at 578.
" Several cases have held shareholders liable for diversion of corporate opportunities when
the shareholders were found to have controlled or dominated the board of directors and
hence have assumed the directors' liability. See Perlman v. Feldman, 219 F.2d 173 (2d Cir.
1955); Lebold v. Inland Steel Co., 125 F.2d 369 (7th Cir. 1941); Austrian v. Williams,
103 F. Supp. 64 (S.D.N.Y. 1952), rev'd on other grounds, 198 F.2d 697 (2d Cir. 1952).
"' Carrington & McElroy, supra note 6, at 965.
97 Guth v. Loft, 23 Del. Ch. 255, 5 A.2d 503 (Sup. Ct. 1939); Durfee v. Durfee & Can-
ning, Inc., 323 Mass. 187, 80 N.E.2d 522 (1948); Lincoln Stores, Inc. v. Grant, 309 Mass.
417, 34 N.E.2d 704 (1941); Hart v. Bell, 222 Minn. 69, 23 N.W.2d 375 (1946); Boxrud v.
Ronning Machinery Co., 217 Minn. 518, 15 N.W.2d 112 (1944); Diedrick v. Helm, 217
Minn. 483, 14 N.W.2d 913 (1944); Rosenblum v. Judson Eng'r Corp., 99 N.H. 267, 109
A.2d 558 (1954); Solimine v. Hollander, 128 N.J. Eq. 228, 16 A.2d 203 (Ch. 1940);
Albert A. Volk Co. v. Fleschner Bros., Inc., 298 App. Div. 717, 60 N.Y.S.2d 244 (Sup.
Ct. 1945); Sutherland, Inc. v. Dahlen, 357 Pa. 143, 53 A.2d 143 (1947).
"SKaufman v. Wolfson, 153 F. Supp. 253 (S.D.N.Y. 1957). The same result occurred
in Golden Rod Mining Co. v. Buckvich, 108 Mont. 569, 92 P.2d 313 (1939), where one
defendant was only a director. The court cited as authority for the imposition of liability
on the director, Tierney v. United Pocahontas Coal Co., 85 W. Va. 545, 102 S.E. 249 (1920),




The early cases involving the corporate opportunity doctrine im-
posed a constructive trust upon property or profits acquired by an
insider only under the relatively restricted circumstances in which a
corporation had a property interest or "expectancy" in the oppor-
tunity. In these cases, the liability does not seem to have been based
on a strict corporate opportunity doctrine. Rather, since the oppor-
tunities were so intimately related to the corporation's activities,
their appropriation would seem to constitute a sufficiently direct inter-
ference with corporate enterprise to come within a general prohibition
against injuring the corporation.
The refusal of the early courts to extend the doctrine, which left
executives free to pursue their own interests in many situations of
potentially great importance to their corporations, may have resulted
from the severity of the constructive trust remedy. Imposition of a
constructive trust sometimes permitted a corporation to recover, in
addition to separate damages for any injury suffered, all profits earned
by the defendant even if they were traceable solely to his initiative
and skill and even though the risk of loss laid entirely on him. What-
ever the motive for the early display of judicial caution, its strength
apparently has diminished with the passage of time, and the recent
cases have definitely expanded the corporate opportunity doctrine be-
yond the narrow pre-existing property interest idea.
The "fairness test" now expounded by the courts is, in essence, that
the circumstances in each case should be weighed and a decision
reached based on fairness and equity. Although the new test has done
away with the property interest aspect of the old cases, it still has
the objectionable aspects of vagueness and unpredictability of re-
sults. Furthermore, decisions have little precedent value for an at-
torney or judge since the new test is based on a balancing of facts.
The fairness test is, however, more certain than the old rule, and
there are particular facts which, if present, will be pivotal in the
decision reached in a case. Once an attorney determines the exist-
ence of these facts, he can be reasonably sure of the court's decision
regarding the corporate opportunity doctrine. Otherwise, all he can
do is determine what appears to be the fairness of the situation,
strenuously argue it to the court, and hope that his sense of fairness
coincides with that of the court.
also holds that a director is subject to the same liability as an officer even if he is a "dummy
director." Irving Trust Co. v. Deutsch, 73 F.2d 121 (2d Cir. 1934) (one of the defendants
was an officer and director, but the other defendants were merely directors); Blaustein v.
Pan American Petroleum & Transp. Co., 293 N.Y. 281, 56 N.E.2d 705 (1944) (most of
the defendants were directors, but three of them were officers).
[Vol. 18
COMMENTS
The recent, more liberal application of the corporate opportunity
doctrine can probably be explained as a judicial recognition of an
affirmative duty on the executive's part to advance the interests of
the corporation. This expansion of the legal duty of an executive to
his corporation seems to reflect the increasing dominance of corporate
enterprises in the American economy, the transition from the prag-
matic morality of a period of rapid industrialization to the ethics of
a society more concerned with consolidation and preservation of its
gains, and the concomitant changes in corporate structure." At a
time when corporate ownership and management typically were fused
in the same individuals, self interest encouraged a loyalty to the cor-
poration, but in today's era of public ownership, stockholders are at
the mercy of insiders whose ownership interest is small. Therefore,
judicial sanctions forcing loyalty to a corporation have become
necessary.
This necessity of protecting the stockholders has manifested itself
not only by the more liberal corporate opportunity rule, but also, in
many instances, by the placement of the burden of proof on the in-
sider to show the lack of a corporate opportunity. The discharge of
this burden is no easy task, for it requires the insider to persuade a
court that certain factors so outweigh other factors that the acquisi-
tion of the opportunity by the insider would not be unfair to the
corporation.
In their great concern for the welfare of public stockholders, the
courts are over-protective to the extent that they treat directors of
corporations the same as officers. This greatly curtails the independent
investment opportunity of businessmen who are directors but not
officers. Directors should be liable for a deprivation of corporate op-
portunities only under more limited circumstances than officers.
Although officers are normally highly paid, full-time employees, di-
rectors generally receive small or nominal stipends and lend only a
portion of their time to any one corporation. Therefore, it is unlikely
that shareholders expect that they will manifest the single-minded
devotion to corporate interests expected of officers. Such single-mind-
edness may be impossible in the case of a director who sits on the
boards of many corporations. To make the director's obligation the
same as the officer's exceeds the expectations of the parties to this
consensual arrangement (i.e., the directors and the shareholders), and
such a result might unfairly trap individuals acting reasonably and
in good faith. This argument is, of course, inapplicable if the direc-
99Berle & Means, The Modern Corporation and Private Property 18-46 (1932). See
generally Holbrook, The Age of Moguls (1953).
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tor's customary role has been enlarged by special agreement, express
or implied, as may often be the case in a closely held corporation. But
under normal corporate operations, it is appropriate for the courts
in determining the fairness of the transaction to consider that a
director rather than an officer was involved, at least as a factor
weighing in his favor.
Although the corporate opportunity doctrine is a judicial sanction
to insure the exercise of an executive's affirmative obligation of
loyalty to his corporation, it provides for only a negative enforce-
ment of that obligation. However, the courts' refusal to allow suits
to compel affirmative executive action or to recover damages for
inaction appears to be based on sound policy. First, entertaining such
actions might encourage a plethora of strike suits, although requiring
security for costs and demand upon shareholders as prerequisites to
bringing such actions would significantly mitigate this danger. Sec-
ond, such actions would require frequent judicial review of business
judgment, with the likely result of subjecting corporate management
to the danger of unpredictable liability. Further, the calculation of
damages-presumably the profits the corporation would have ob-
tained had the opportunity been exploited by it-would seem vir-
tually impossible.
The courts have avoided these potential dangers in enforcing the
executive's affirmative obligation by acting only to remedy his mis-
appropriations of corporate opportunities by transferring to the cor-
poration the opportunity which belongs to it, plus whatever profit
has been realized. This remedy, based as it is upon a determination of
unfairness, appears to make the present corporate opportunity doc-
trine a practicable and equitable judicial sanction for enforcing cor-
porate loyalty by insiders in today's era of public corporate owner-
ship.
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